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Abstract 
This article probes into how regions organize themselves to deal effectively with the Europe 2020 reform program. 
More specifically, it maps governance structures of regional policy-making and implementation of Europe 2020 and ex-
plains variation in these structures between policy domains and policy stages. The empirical focus is Flanders as this 
Belgian region possesses substantial legislative and executive autonomy and is therefore highly affected by the Europe 
2020 program. The article distinguishes between policy-making (upload) and implementation stages (download) in edu-
cation, energy and poverty policies. It is hypothesized that the varying impact of Europe 2020 can be attributed to the 
varying adaptational pressure of EU programs and a set of domestic intervening factors. Findings indicate variation be-
tween policy domains and policy stages on a continuum from lead-organization governed networks to shared partici-
pant governance networks. Overall, the extent to which Flanders is competent seems to be crucial. In addition, a sub-
stantial administrative capacity is needed to firmly steer and coordinate the governance structures that manage Europe 
2020 policies. The level of integration further increases the extent to which Flemish Europe 2020 policies are steered. 
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1. Introduction 
Regions, Member States and the European Union (EU) 
itself are all confronted with major social, economic and 
budgetary challenges. The sovereign debt crisis, the eu-
ro-zone upheaval and the stagnation of the national and 
regional economies have been dominating the European 
and domestic agendas since 2008. The EU has imple-
mented several policies to cope with these challenges. 
One of these tools is the large-scale Europe 2020 reform 
program whereby the EU aims for high levels of em-
ployment, productivity and social cohesion through 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Europe 2020 is 
not implemented by legislation but by the coordination 
of national policies, inspired by the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC) of the earlier Lisbon Strategy. The 
OMC is “in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which 
the union, the Member States, the regional and local 
levels, as well as social partners and civil society, will be 
actively involved, using variable forms of partnership” 
(European Council, 2000, para. 38). Its architecture is 
based on soft law and its main EU goal is to disseminate 
best practices in order to achieve greater convergence 
among member states and regions (Tucker, 2003).  
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Unlike its predecessor, the Europe 2020 program is 
expected to generate substantial effects as it is incor-
porated in the framework of the European Semester. 
Through this European Semester, the Commission is 
empowered to monitor the economic and budgetary 
policies of Member States and to take action when 
agreed targets are not reached. While Europe 2020 
policies are predominantly decided by European level 
institutions, Member States play a major role during 
the policy preparation and policy implementation stag-
es. In federal and highly decentralized member states, 
both national and regional authorities are challenged 
by Europe 2020 policies. Via intra-state as well as ex-
tra-state channels (Jeffery, 2000) regions are involved 
in the policy formulation and implementation of Eu-
rope 2020 policy measures whenever the latter touch 
upon their competences. This paper probes into how 
the regional level organizes itself to deal effectively 
with Europe 2020 policy-making and implementation. 
As regions can be involved in several stages and policy 
domains we expect variation in the way they deal with 
Europe 2020.  
Based on findings from the Europeanization litera-
ture (Bursens, 2012), we expect a differential impact of 
Europe 2020 due to domestic intervening variables. 
Our core research question is therefore how we can 
explain the variation in regional governance structures 
established in response to the Europe 2020 program. 
More specifically, this paper aims to map the govern-
ance structures of regional policy-making and imple-
mentation of Europe 2020 and to explain variation in 
these governance structures between policy domains 
and policy stages. We distinguish between the policy-
making stage (upload) and implementation stage 
(download) in education, energy and poverty policies. 
Our empirical focus is Flanders as this Belgian region 
possesses substantial legislative and executive auton-
omy in the selected policy fields and is therefore highly 
affected by the Europe 2020 program.  
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it dis-
cusses the relevant literature on Europeanization and 
governance in order to conceptualize the way regional 
governance structures are steered and to identify the 
variables that translate the adaptational pressure put 
on the regional governance structures by the Europe 
2020 program. Next, the cases are presented. In the 
third part we operationalize and measure the variables. 
The final part maps the Flemish governance structures 
in response to the Europe 2020 program and accounts 
for the variation between the selected policy domains 
and policy stages. 
2. Europeanization of Regional Governance Structures 
Research on the adaptation of the regional level to Eu-
ropean integration is relatively recent and has not de-
livered univocal conclusions (Graziano & Vink, 2008). In 
a literature review, Bursens concluded that “all empiri-
cal findings reveal some impact of European integra-
tion on the regional level, but there is no agreement on 
the intensity or the direction of the impact.”(Bursens, 
2012, pp. 400-401). The literature suggests that re-
gional authorities implement EU policies in diverse 
ways contingent to the varying national contexts (Bor-
ghetto & Franchino, 2010; Sturm & Dieringer, 2005). 
Furthermore, the focus has mainly been on explaining 
variation between EU policy coordination mechanisms 
(Kassim, Peters, & Wright, 2000; Wessels, Maurer, & 
Mittag, 2003; Zeff & Pirro, 2006), the integration of the 
OMC in domestic policymaking arenas (Macphail, 2010; 
Weishaupt, 2009; Zeitlin, 2009) and regional actors’ 
preferences and strategies (Bache, 2008; Dyson & 
Goetz, 2003). This paper builds upon the Europeaniza-
tion literature but shifts the focus from comparing re-
gions towards comparing policy domains and policy 
stages. In addition, by looking at regional governance 
structures in response to Europe 2020, it adds to the 
analyses of regional implementation of EU legislation.  
The extent to which the regional level responds to 
European integration depends on the adaptational 
pressure, or how well European and regional policies fit 
together (Börzel & Risse, 2000). The introduction of the 
OMC by the Lisbon Strategy aimed at bringing Europe-
an integration in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
After the mid-term review, the focus of the Lisbon 
Strategy shifted towards the goals of competitiveness, 
growth and jobs (Zeitlin, 2009) since the EU was not 
able to urge member states to participate more in-
tensely in the OMC procedures for social inclusion and 
sustainable development. As the Europe 2020 program 
also functions along the lines of the open method of 
coordination, the extent to which regional authorities 
are confronted with adaptational pressure is reflected 
by the EU’s ability to push forward on the Europe 2020 
objectives. A high adaptational pressure constitutes a 
trigger for regions to adapt governance structures and 
policies. To explain how regional authorities respond to 
the Europe 2020 program, the Europeanization litera-
ture points to a range of intervening factors that facili-
tate or constrain the adaptation process. In this paper 
we borrow these intervening factors from rational and 
sociological institutionalism. 
2.1. Mapping Governance Structures 
A necessary step to address our research question is to 
describe how regions deal with Europe 2020 in differ-
ent policy domains and policy stages, by mapping how 
political and administrative actors as well as societal 
organizations are embedded in governance structures. 
Newman (2001) describes governance as a mechanism 
for solving common problems on various levels. More 
specifically, governance structures are about coordina-
tion mechanisms that settle decision-making and im-
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plementation between actors by allocating tasks and 
resources among those actors (Carver, 2000; Kooiman, 
1993; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). According to Pierre 
(2000), “governance refers to sustaining coordination 
and coherence among a wide variety of actors with dif-
ferent purposes and objectives”. The performance and 
effectiveness of governance structures mainly depends 
on how they are steered (Provan & Milward, 1995). 
Over time coordination mechanisms have been gradu-
ally transformed from traditional governmental steer-
ing, characterized by hierarchical, direct top-down con-
trol towards more autonomy and self-responsibility for 
administrative actors and a stronger involvement of 
societal organizations (Kickert, 2005; Nelissen, 2002). 
This implies a tendency to manage or steer actors and 
processes rather than controlling them in a top-down 
fashion (Borgason & Musso, 2006). Such more horizon-
tal and mixed public/private policy networks are ar-
gued to increase the problem-solving capacity of gov-
ernmental action as they combine the expertise and 
means of both state and non-state actors (Wolf, 2001).  
However, steering instead of controlling actors may 
still take place under the shadow of hierarchy (Börzel & 
Risse, 2005), since some organizations may have ad-
vantages over others to assign tasks and goals, some-
times assisted by (financial) means. There is, in other 
words, a wide variety in policy networks. One useful 
classification is provided by Provan and Kenis (2008). 
Based on the involvement of actors and the decision-
making procedures within mixed networks, Kenis and 
Provan identify two ideal types of networks with 
shared participant governance networks and lead-
organization governed networks at the far ends. 
Whereas shared participant governance networks are 
characterized by collective decision-making procedures 
based on unanimity and a high degree of involvement 
of all actors thereby resulting in high density networks, 
lead-organization governed networks function in the 
opposite way by allocating decision-making powers to 
one or a few actors who thereby obtain a central posi-
tion in the network. Although both ideal types of net-
works increase the problem-solving capacity of gov-
ernmental regulation, empirical research (Brower & 
Choi, 2006; Creech, Huppé, & Knoblauch, 2012; Kenis & 
Provan, 2006; Provan & Milward, 1995) suggests that 
networks that are steered by just one or a few actors 
are more effective in reaching their goals. This paper 
doesn’t aim to explain the effectiveness of governance 
structures, but seeks to understand why specific gov-
ernance structures are installed, the latter being con-
sidered as one of the variables that can explain effec-
tiveness. We use social network analysis to 
operationalize the network types suggested by Kenis 
and Provan (2006) in the context of Europe 2020 poli-
cies. By calculating the network’s density and the ac-
tors’ degree of centralization in the network while ac-
counting for their competences to initiate and 
coordinate policy initiatives, we define the governance 
structures as either shared participant governance 
networks or lead-organization governed networks. 
2.2. Explaining Governance Structures 
We now turn to the factors that can account for varia-
tion between governance structures when adapting to 
Europe 2020 policies. First, adaptational pressure is ex-
erted via the OMC procedures of Europe 2020. A high 
adaptational pressure triggers regions to adapt gov-
ernance structures and policies in order to comply with 
Europe 2020. This adaptational pressure is the inde-
pendent variable in our model. Next, we expect that 
variation in Europe 2020 governance can be explained 
by how domestic intervening variables tap into this 
pressure. We look at the domestic division of compe-
tences and the regional administrative capacity to deal 
with Europe 2020 (derived from rational choice institu-
tionalist theories) and the political and administrative 
support for Europe 2020 policies (taken from sociologi-
cal institutionalism). 
As EU competences have broadened and deepened 
over time, the EU’s influence on national politics and 
policies increased (Birk, Gos, Haas, & Tadini, 2010). So 
we argue that the extent to which adaptational pres-
sure is exerted via Europe 2020 mainly depends on the 
level of EU competences and thus differs across policy 
domains. According to Pfetsch (2004) a higher degree 
of integration is likely for policy domains in which the 
EU has acquired significant regulatory powers. We ex-
pect that the extent to which the EU is able to put 
pressure on regions to act on the European growth 
strategy is contingent on the degree of legislative pow-
ers and the amount of regulatory measures. The ab-
sence of such powers undermines EU undertakings to 
reach the Europe 2020 targets. The European Commis-
sion is aware of its powers and has drawn lessons from 
the failed Lisbon Strategy (Schoukens, 2014). Attempt-
ing to overcome its lack of competences in certain poli-
cy areas, the Commission increased the entanglement 
of the Europe 2020 objectives and strategies. However, 
despite the Commission’s efforts to fuse policy issues 
from different policy areas (such as education and em-
ployment), its capacity to guide or even urge regions to 
act on Europe 2020 continues to depend on its legisla-
tive and regulatory powers. In case of only modest com-
petences the EU will find it hard to stimulate regions to 
establish strong governance structures aimed at coordi-
nating Europe 2020 policies. On the other hand, if the 
EU is able to play out its competences, regions and par-
ticularly regional governments will be more inclined to 
act on Europe 2020 by coordinating policy initiatives and 
actors. Hence our first hypothesis: the more integrated 
the policy domain in the EU sphere, the more the region-
al governance structure will be organized according to 
the lead-organization governed network. 
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Although the adaptational pressure triggers regions 
to adapt governance structures, domestic intervening 
factors are expected to differentiate the impact. In 
federal systems, legislative as well as executive compe-
tences are allocated at various levels (De Vicq, Van 
Hecke & Buyst, 2014). This constitutional setting func-
tions as an opportunity structure in which domestic ac-
tors’ behavior is shaped. The division of competences 
between governmental levels includes the allocation of 
means and the authority to initiate policies (Provan & 
Kenis, 2007) and therefore also the responsibility to as-
sure a performant governance structure. When a re-
gional government has competences in a certain policy 
domain, it has the capacity to coordinate the govern-
ance structure and to determine the policy content. 
According to Saunders (2006), decentralization indeed 
strengthens the capacity of the sub-national constitu-
ent units. This is even moreso the case when regions 
are granted the competence to conduct foreign rela-
tions with respect to their competences. Being compe-
tent for a wide range of policies also affects the quanti-
ty and complexity of policy issues. A high number and 
high variety of policy measures and involved actors re-
quires high levels of coordination. We expect strong 
coordination in those policy domains for regions which 
are strongly competent (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Hence 
our second hypothesis based on the extent to which a 
region is competent: The stronger the regional compe-
tences in a policy domain, the more the regional gov-
ernance structures will be organized according to a 
lead-organization governed network. 
Besides the institutional environment of govern-
ance structures, we also look at the actual efforts ac-
tors put into influencing and implementing Europe 
2020 policies. The EU is a multilevel system requiring 
the establishment and management of coordination 
capacities. This administrative capacity of domestic ac-
tors is equally a part of the opportunity structure in 
which domestic actors try to maximize their prefer-
ences: it is considered as a facilitating factor for the 
successful implementation of Europe 2020 policies. We 
expect that the ability of regions to deal with European 
policies also depends on the administrative capacity to 
upload and download EU policies (Börzel, 2002). Cadri 
(2014) defines administrative capacity as “the process 
through which individuals, organizations and societies 
obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set 
and achieve their development objectives over time”. 
More specifically related to Europeanization, Börzel 
and Risse (2000) and Deforche and Bursens (2012) pro-
vide a more specific approach considering only the 
administrative capacity that deals with European is-
sues. Administrative capacity is highly relevant in this 
context as research has pointed out that most instanc-
es of non-compliance with international agreements 
are due to a lack of capacity (Jacobson & Weiss, 1998; 
Perkins & Neumayer, 2007). Being able to mobilize ca-
pacity provides regions with steering capabilities in 
particular governance structures (Milio, 2007). We ex-
pect that the specific role of the minister’s office or the 
department, which includes high-level policy-making 
and planning tasks, is strengthened by a high degree of 
administrative capacity. Our third hypothesis therefore 
puts that the more administrative capacity devoted to 
Europe 2020, the more the governance structure will 
resemble a lead-organization governed network.  
Finally, we consider the actors operating in the 
structures. How do administrative and political actors 
react to the Europe 2020 program? Do they support all 
Europe 2020 policies to the same extent? We expect 
that the level of support affects the efforts regional ac-
tors invest in uploading and downloading Europe 2020 
policies. The intervening variable support thus departs 
from the logic of appropriateness: domestic actors deal 
with European 2020 as they see fit with their position 
towards the program. According to Sorensen and Torf-
ing (2005) networks establish a frame of mutual inter-
est for consensus building among various stakeholders. 
They argue that when actors are strongly involved, 
they are more likely to be supportive. Due to that mu-
tual interest, supportive actors have a similar focus on 
what is to be done, but more importantly also on how 
things should be done. Furthermore, widespread sup-
port facilitates cooperation and exchange of infor-
mation within a governance structure. In shared partic-
ipant governed networks, the performance and 
effectiveness depends to a great extent on the consen-
sus between the actors. The more a network lacks con-
sensus, or the less supportive actors are, the higher the 
need for a lead-organization in the network in order to 
assure the performance and effectiveness (Van 
Oorschot, 2015). Therefore we expect weak steering 
mechanisms in cases of high support. Hypothesis 4 
stipulates that the more supportive actors are, the 
more the governance structure will be structured ac-
cording to a shared participant governance network.  
To conclude, previous research has pointed to the 
advantages of lead-organization governed networks 
over shared participant governance networks in terms 
of performance and effectiveness. Hence, the way re-
gional governance structures are steered is crucial for 
achieving Europe 2020 policy objectives. We expect 
that regions install varying structures in different do-
mains and suggest four hypotheses to account for this 
variation. In the next sections we present and motivate 
our empirical cases before turning to the operationali-
zation and analysis. 
3. Case-Selection 
Europe 2020 focuses on smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth. These priorities break down into 10 inte-
grated guidelines which serve as themes in the national 
reform programs and trigger specific policy initiatives. 
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We selected one integrated guideline for each priority, 
taking into account the Belgian division of competenc-
es. For smart growth we selected reducing the rates of 
early school leaving below 10%, from the policy field of 
education which is a quasi-exclusive regional compe-
tence; in the area of sustainable growth we opted for 
20% of energy from renewables, energy policy being a 
mixed federal/regional competence; regarding inclusive 
growth 20 million (on EU level) fewer people in or at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion was selected as poverty 
policies predominantly belong to the federal level.  
From the perspective of regions, one can distin-
guish between four different policy stages in the con-
text of Europe 2020: participation in the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) processes of Europe 2020, the 
draft of the Regional (RNP) and National Reform Pro-
grams (NRP), the implementation of the NRP and the 
follow-up and feedback on the national level. In order 
to reduce complexity, we simplified these to two stag-
es: (1) the European semester, i.e. participation in the 
OMC and the drafting of the Reform Programs, which is 
a process mainly oriented at the European level and (2) 
the national semester, i.e. the implementation and the 
follow-up of the agreed reform program which takes 
place at the (sub)national level. This leaves us with in 
total six cases, as listed in Table 1. 



















4. Operationalization and Measurement of the 
Dependent and Independent Variables  
To map the governance structures as a whole and to 
position the actors within those structures we used So-
cial Network Analysis (SNA). SNA captures the com-
plexity of social relationships by analyzing numerical 
data and visualizing the set of actors involved as well as 
the relations between those actors (Hawea & Ghali, 
2008). A social network can be defined as “a specific 
set of linkages among a defined set of persons with the 
additional property that the characteristics of these 
linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social 
behavior of the persons involved.“ (Mitchell, 1969). We 
conducted 31 interviews with political and administra-
tive actors as well as societal organizations from Sep-
tember 2013 till January 2014 (appendix—list of re-
spondents). We presented the respondents a list of 
actors that may have been active with respect to one 
of the selected Europe 2020 integrated guidelines. Re-
spondents were asked to indicate the frequency and 
direction of the contacts and to qualify the relation as 
information transfer or substantial cooperation. More-
over, respondents were given the opportunity to add 
actors to the list which were then included in the fol-
lowing interviews. The extent to which data is missing 
is crucial for SNA as it has an impact on the outcome of 
SNA-indicators. The impact of missing data differs 
among SNA-indicators, meaning that some indicators 
are more robust than others. The indicators centrality 
degree and density are very robust measures in SNA 
(Wangh, Shi, Mcfarland, & Leskovec, 2012). The ro-
bustness of degree centrality and density holds when 
80% of the data is taken up (Costenbader & Valente, 
2003), meaning that the output on those indicators will 
not change significantly by adding more data. Although 
not all involved actors could be interviewed, the per-
centage of missing data is sufficiently low to allow for a 
valid interpretation of the network data. (69%, 55% 
and 69% response rate and 8.3%, 19% and 8,3% miss-
ing data in the education, energy and poverty case re-
spectively). The robustness of our network data is fur-
ther strengthened as we have data on all the spill-
actors of the governance structures. Furthermore, the 
network data have been double-checked with the core 
members of the network. 
In order to determine to what extent a governance 
structure is organized according to a shared participant 
governance network rather than a lead-organization 
governed network, we look at the degree of density 
and the position of authoritative actors (Creech, Hup-
pé, & Knoblauch, 2012; Kenis & Provan, 2006). The 
boundaries of those governance structures are fixed by 
the cases, i.e. by the regional competences for the pol-
icy domains energy, poverty and education. Hence, the 
description of regional governance structures is based 
on the relations between actors within those regional 
boundaries. Actors from the federal or the local level 
are only relevant if they have a functional role for the 
regional level, i.e. when conceived as relevant by the 
actors that are by definition part of the regional gov-
ernance structure. Both density and degree of centrali-
ty are used to define the type of steering. While the 
density indicator is a measure on the level of the gov-
ernance structure, the degree of centrality allows us to 
measure for each actor the extent to which it has ac-
quired a central position in the governance structure. 
We use the normalized indicators as this allows for 
comparisons between cases of different sizes. 
First, we measure the networks’ degree of density. 
The more dense a network, the more it reflects a 
shared participant governed network, as the latter’s 
performance depends on collective action decisions by 
unanimity. Next we look at whether the networks pos-
sess authoritative actors and—if so—how many. This 
indicates to what extent governance structure is 
steered by a lead-organization (one or two authorita-
tive actors). More specifically, when an authoritative 
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actor has the most or is close to the most central posi-
tion, it can be assumed to be highly capable to steer 
the governance structure which points to a lead-
organization governed network. On the contrary, when 
such actors are not the most or not even close to the 
most central position and in case of highly dense net-
works, the governance structure will be labeled as a 
shared participant governance network. 
Next, we turn to the operationalization of the inde-
pendent and intervening variables. The adaptational 
pressure is indicated by the level of EU integration. We 
use the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to 
determine the extent to which the EU exerts powers in 
different policy fields. In addition, we use the amount 
of regulations and directives for which data are derived 
from EUR-Lex. Variation between the networks can fur-
ther be accounted for by domestic intervening factors. 
Concerning the division of competences, the Belgian 
constitution clearly addresses the allocation to the dif-
ferent governmental levels. Secondly, the administra-
tive capacity is measured by the amount of personnel 
that directly deals with Europe 2020. Although human 
resources only cover a partial aspect of administrative 
capacity, it is considered as a strong indicator for finan-
cial resources too (Beyers & Kerremans, 2007). Hence, 
respondents were asked to provide an adequate evalu-
ation of the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) di-
rectly working on Europe 2020. Finally, the extent to 
which actors support the way Europe 2020 is dealt with 
is extracted from the questionnaire: we asked 
respondents to express their opinion with respect to 
the regional and European policy initiatives based on 
the following questions “Compared to the other Inte-
grated Guidelines, how do you perceive the im-
portance of this (case-specific) Integrated Guideline in 
the Europe 2020 strategy?” and “Compared to the oth-
er Integrated Guidelines, how do you perceive the im-
portance of this (case-specific) Integrated Guideline in 
the (sub)national reform program?”. The questionnaire 
data were aggregated as the independent variables are 
situated on the level of the governance structures and 
not on the level of individual actors. 
5. Governance Structures and Intervening Factors in 
Six Europe 2020 Networks 
Considering the density of the networks, we found lit-
tle variation between cases with exception of the gov-
ernance structure for energy during the European Se-
mester (see Table 2). The network density of the latter 
(15%) is very low in contrast to the other cases (be-
tween 37% and 46%). This implies that the case of en-
ergy during the European Semester cannot be catego-
rized as a shared participant governance network. For 
the other cases, the absence or presence of centrally 
positioned authoritative actors will further define the 
type of network. We found clear variation between the 
governance structures, not only with respect to the 
type of network, but also with regard to the involve-
ment of different types of actors. 
Table 2. Degree of centrality and type of network in six cases. 
Case Density Normalized degree of Centrality Type of network 
1. Education – European semester 37% 1st - MIN EDUCATION - 11,5 
2nd - DEP EDUCATION - 8,7 
3rd - VLOR - 6,3 
4th - VOKA - 5,3 
Lead-organization 
governed network 
2. Education – National semester 42% 1st - MIN EDUCATION - 28,3 
2nd - DEP EDUCATION - 18,2 
3rd - VOKA - 10,3 
4th - VLOR - 8,5 
Lead-organization 
governed network 
3. Energy – European semester 15% 1st - VOKA - 1,4 
2nd - SERV - 1 
4th - DEP ENERGY - 0,9 
11th - MIN ENERGY - 0,1 
Weak governance 
network 
4. Energy – National semester 40% 1st - VEA - 17,3 
2nd - VOKA - 16,6 
3rd - MIN ENERGY - 14,5 
6th - DEP ENERGY - 6,4 
Mixed lead-organization / 
shared participant 
governance network 
5. Poverty – European semester 38% 1st - Vl-PV - 9,1 
2nd - DEP WELZIJN - 6,5 
3rd - POD MI - 5,8 
4th - MIN ARMOEDE - 3,8 
Shared participant 
governance network 
6. Poverty – National semester 46% 1st - NETWERK T. ARMOEDE - 9,4 
2nd - CARITAS - 6,4 
4th - DEP WELZIJN - 5,5 
5th - MIN ARMOEDE - 4,5 
Shared participant 
governance network 
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The policy domain of education strongly resembles a 
lead-organization governed network for both the Euro-
pean and the national semester (respectively Figure 1 
and 2; Table 3 provides the legend for interpreting all 
visualized governance structures, whereas Table 4 list 
actors in the networks of education). In both stages—
and even more outspoken during the national semes-
ter, the minister of education and his personal staff 
(MIN EDUCATION) are positioned in the center, fol-
lowed in second place by the department for education 
and training (DEP EDUCATION). Furthermore, taking a 
look at the visualized governance structure, also the 
VLOR, the advisory council on educational policies, 
seems to have acquired a rather central position. Re-
markably, the VLOR’s position is far less central during 
the national semester, which was confirmed by its re-
spondent who suggested that the VLOR is specifically 
crucial in conveying European policies and actions to 
educational actors in society. 
Governance structures in the energy domain (Table 
5 lists actors in the networks of energy) differ substan-
tially across the stages, as the variation in density of re-
lations has already made clear. During the European 
semester (see Figure 3) the authoritative actors (the 
minister of energy and the department of environ-
ment, nature and energy) lack a central position, point-
ing at the absence of a clear lead-organization. The low 
number of relations among the actors suggests that 
Europe 2020 is not very salient among energy-related 
actors. This was confirmed by several respondents who 
stated that Europe 2020 is perceived as being of mere-
ly secondary importance. The EU takes a lot of legisla-
tive initiatives in the energy domain which is intensive-
ly monitored and discussed at the Flemish level at the 
expense of the Europe 2020 energy targets. During the 
national semester (see Figure 4), on the contrary, the 
minister of energy is more intensively involved. Looking 
at the degree of centrality, he is not the foremost cen-
tral actor, but the relatively high score still pictures him 
as being able to lead the governance structure. Re-
markably, however, the executive Agency for Energy 
(VEA) and the Flemish Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry (VOKA) are considered to be stronger involved 
than the minister, suggesting a more shared participant 
governance approach that is neither centrally nor col-
lectively steered. Hence, we classify the governance 
structure for energy during the national semester as a 
mixed lead-organization governed/shared participant 
governance network. 
Table 3. Legend of governance structures. 
Type of actor Frequency of relations 
  Political actor 
 Administrative actor 
 Societal organization 
Daily contact 
Weekly to monthly contact 
Less frequent contact 
Table 4. Actors in the networks of education. 
● Vlaams Minister van Onderwijs (MIN EDUCATION) - Flemish Minister of Education  
● Departement van Onderwijs en Vorming (DEP EDUCATION) - Department of Education and Training  
● Departement Diensten voor het Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR) - Services for the General Government 
Policy 
● Agentschap voor Onderwijscommunicatie (AOC) - Agency for Education Communication 
● Agentschap voor Hoger Onderwijs, Volwassenenonderwijs en Studietoelagen (AHOVOS) - Agency for Higher 
Education, Adult Education and Grants  
● Agentschap voor Kwaliteitszorg in Onderwijs en Vorming (AKOV) - Agency for Quality Control in Education 
and Training 
● Agentschap voor Infrastructuur in het Onderwijs (AGION) - Agency for Education Infrastructure  
● Agentschap voor Onderwijsdiensten (AGODI) - Agency for Education Services 
● Vlaamse Universiteiten en Hogescholen Raad (VLUHR) - Flemish Council of Universities and Higher Education  
● Vlaamse Onderwijsraad (VLOR) - Flemish Council of Education 
● Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen (SERV) - Social and Economic Council of Flanders  
● Algemene Afvaardiging van de Vlaamse Regering bij de Europese Unie (VL-PV) - Flemish Representative 
within the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU  
● Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling (VDAB) - The Public Employment Service of Flanders  
● Vlaamse Jeugdraad (JEUGDRAAD) - Flemish Council of Youth  
● Vlaams Netwerk van Ondernemingen (VOKA) - Flanders' Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
● Vlaams-Europees Verbindingsagentschap (VLEVA) - The Liaison Agency Flanders-Europe  
● Interkabinettenwerkgroep (IKW) - Inter-cabinet Working Groups 
● Vlaams Parlement (PARL) – Flemish Parliament 
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Table 5. Actors in the networks of energy. 
● Staatssecretaris voor Leefmilieu, Energie, Mobiliteit (FED MIN) – State Secretary for Environment, Energy 
and Mobility 
● FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie (FOD ENERGY) - FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and 
Energy 
● Vlaams Minister van Energie (MIN ENERGY) - Flemish Minister of Energy  
● Departement Leefmilieu, Natuur en Energie (DEP ENERGY) - Department of Environment, Nature and Energy  
● Departement Mobiliteit en Openbare Werken (DEP MOW) - Department of Mobility and Public Works 
● Departement Diensten voor het Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR) - Services for 
the General Government Policy 
● Vlaams Energieagentschap (VEA) - Flemish Agency of Energy 
● Agentschap voor Wegen en Verkeer (AWV) - Agency for Roads and Traffic  
● Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas (CREG) - Commission forRegulation of 
Electricity and Gas 
● Vlaamse Regulator van de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt (VREG) - Flemish regulator for elektricity and natural 
gas 
● Milieu- en Natuurraad van Vlaanderen (MINA) - Flemish Council on Environment and Nature  
● Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen (SERV) - Social and Economic Council of Flanders  
● Algemene Afvaardiging van de Vlaamse Regering bij de Europese Unie (VL-PV) - Flemish Representative 
within the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU  
● Vlaams Netwerk van Ondernemingen (VOKA) - Flanders' Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
● Natuurpunt (NATUURPUNT) - Natuurpunt 
● Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL) - Federation for a Better Environment 
● Federatie van de Belgische Elektriciteits- en Gas Bedrijven (FEBEG) - Federation of Belgian Producers of 
Energy  
● Organisatie Duurzame Energie (ODE) - Organisation for Sustainable Energy 
● Vlaams-Europees Verbindingsagentschap (VLEVA) - The Liaison Agency Flanders-Europe  
● Interkabinettenwerkgroep (IKW) - Inter-cabinet Working Groups 
● Vlaams Parlement (PARL) – Flemish Parliament 
 
Figure 1.Education—European semester. 
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Figure 2. Education—National semester. 
 
Figure 3. Energy—European semester. 
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Figure 4. Energy—National semester. 
The governance structures in the policy domain of 
poverty most clearly resemble shared participant gov-
erned networks (see Figure 5 and 6). During the na-
tional semester the most central positions are obtained 
by societal organizations or administrative actors (Ta-
ble 6 lists actors in the networks of poverty), suggest-
ing a lack of steering by the competent department or 
the responsible minister and his staff. Although the de-
partment of welfare, public health and family is the 
second most central actor in the governance structure 
during the European semester, the corresponding 
score on the degree of centrality is rather weak (6.5%). 
On the contrary, and especially during the national se-
mester, societal organizations are far more involved. 
But even their score on the degree of centrality indica-
tor remains quite modest. From this, we conclude that 
poverty governance structures are organized in ac-
cordance to a shared participant governance network. 
In the remaining part of this section we map the in-
dependent and intervening variables that have been 
identified as potential explanations for the variation in 
governance structures (see table 7 for an overview). 
First, the degree of EU competences is expected to af-
fect regional governance structures as this variable in-
dicates the amount of adaptational pressure. Article 4 
of the TFEU explicitly stipulates that the EU has a sub-
stantial degree of authority regarding energy issues: 
member states can act only in so far the EU has not 
acted. The EU has no such powers for education or 
poverty. Education is mentioned in article 6: the EU is 
allowed to coordinate, support or supplement policies 
developed by member states. Concerning poverty, the 
EU may only act conform article 5, i.e. provide ar-
rangements such as the European platform against 
poverty and social exclusion in which member states 
participate to coordinate their policies on social inclu-
sion. Having substantial powers is one indicator, the 
extent to which those powers are exercised is yet an-
other. EUR-Lex is a useful tool to determine the level of 
actual policy practice. A search for the keywords ener-
gy, education, poverty and social inclusion, delivered 
450, 98, 1 and 6 hits respectively. Both indicators make 
clear that EU exercises considerably more regulatory 
powers in the policy domain energy than in the fields 
of education and poverty.  
Next, the Belgian constitutional set-up reveals the 
competences allocated to the regional level. Education 
policy is a quasi-exclusive regional competence as it is 
allocated to the Belgian subnational Communities. In 
the domain of energy policy, the division of compe-
tences is more nuanced. The regional level enjoys legis-
lative and executive powers with respect to energy re-
newables, isolation of houses and buildings, traffic 
(including public transport) and road infrastructure, 
whereas the federal level acts on matters of energy in-
frastructure (transmission grid), nuclear energy and 
energy prices. In other words, energy is a mixed com-
petence, making both levels responsible to comply 
with a series of Europe 2020 energy objectives. In the 
policy domain of poverty too, both the federal and the 
regional level are equipped with competences to com-
bat poverty and to increase social inclusion. The bal-
ance heads over to the federal level, though, as the lat-
ter runs the social security system, including 
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unemployment benefits and income support. The re-
gional level has only supplementary powers, meaning 
that it is allowed to take measures in the area of social 
inclusion within the range of other policy competences 
(such as education). 
Table 6. Actors in the networks of poverty. 
● Vlaams Minister voor Innovatie, Overheidsinvesteringen, Media en Armoedebestrijding (MIN ARMOEDE) - Flemish 
Minister for Innovation, Public Investment, Media and Poverty  
● Vlaams Minister voor Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Gezin (MIN WELZIJN) – Flemish Minister foor Welfare, Public 
Health and Family 
● Departement Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Gezin (DEP WELZIJN) - Flemish Department of Welfare, Public Health 
and Family  
● POD Maatschappelijke Integratie (POD MI) - PPS Social Integration, anti-Poverty Policy, Social Economy and 
Federal Urban Policy  
● Strategische Adviesraad voor het Welzijns-, Gezondheids- en Gezinsbeleid (SARWGG) - Strategic Advisory Council 
for Welfare, Health & Family Policy  
● Welzijnszorg (WELZIJNSZORG) - Welzijnszorg 
● Vlaamse Jeugdraad (JEUGDRAAD) - Flemish Council of Youth 
● Agentschap Jongerenwelzijn (JONGERENWELZIJN) – Youth Welfare Agency 
● Netwerk Tegen Armoede (NETWERK TEGEN ARMOEDE) - Network against Poverty 
● Caritas Vlaanderen (CARITAS) - Caritas Flanders  
● Departement Diensten voor het Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR) - Services for the General Government Policy 
● Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen (SERV) - Social and Economic Council of Flanders  
● Algemene Afvaardiging van de Vlaamse Regering bij de Europese Unie (VL-PV) - Flemish Representative within the 
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU  
● Permanente Vertegenwoordig van België in de Europese Unie (FED-PV) - Permanent Representation of Belgium to 
the EU 
● Vlaams-Europees Verbindingsagentschap (VLEVA) - The Liaison Agency Flanders-Europe  
● Interkabinettenwerkgroep (IKW) - Inter-cabinet Working Groups 
● Vlaams Parlement (PARL) – Flemish Parliament 
● Centrum Algemeen Welzijnswerk (CAW) – Centres for General Well-being 
 
Figure 5. Poverty—European semester. 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 100-116 111 
 
Figure 6. Poverty—National semester. 
Table 7. Overview of variables in six cases. 
 Independent Variable Intervening factors Dependent Variable 
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During the interviews respondents indicated to what 
extent they support the way the EU and the regional 
level deal with the Europe 2020 integrated guidelines. 
Support was scaled from no support at all (1/5) to high-
ly supportive (5/5). The data reveal clear differences: 
while actors in the policy domain of education are 
highly supportive (on average 4,4/5), those in the do-
main of energy are moderately supportive (on average 
3,6/5) and those in the field of poverty are only weakly 
in favor (on average 2,7/5).  
Finally, regarding administrative capacity we asked 
respondents to determine the number of people work-
ing explicitly on the Europe 2020 targets. The policy 
domain of education is clearly the best equipped to 
deal with Europe 2020, having on average 1,6 FTE’s per 
actor in the network, compared to 1,2 FTE’s in the field 
of energy and 0,7 in the field of poverty. More im-
portantly, the authoritative actors in the policy domain 
of education, the ministerial staff and the department 
of education, employ respectively 2,5 and 2 FTE’s 
working on Europe 2020, rendering them comparative-
ly well equipped to lead the governance structure. 
With respect to the policy domain of energy both the 
department and the ministerial staff reported only 1 
FTE dealing with Europe 2020. A significantly higher 
capacity (3 FTE) is reported for the Flemish Energy 
Agency (VEA). Concerning the policy domain of pov-
erty, the average amount of FTE’s is only 0,7, which is 
the lowest of all policy domains. The ministerial staff 
only slightly exceeds the average administrative capaci-
ty with a total of 1 FTE. The highest number of staff is 
recorded for the Flemish Representation within the 
Belgian Permanent Representation (VL-PV), employing 
2 FTE’s to deal with Europe 2020. 
6. Explaining the Variation in Governance Structures’ 
Type of Steering 
The three policy domains of education, energy and 
poverty are subjected to a varying degree of adapta-
tional pressure induced by the Europe 2020 program. 
Moreover, domestic intervening variables further dif-
ferentiate the impact of the adaptational pressure. 
Across all three policy domains, we found that regional 
governance structures activated to deal with Europe 
2020 are managed by varying steering mechanisms. In 
this section we seek to explain this variation by analyz-
ing how the identified domestic variables nuance the 
adaptational pressure on governance structures.  
Education and poverty clearly have opposite steer-
ing mechanisms in both policy stages while the degree 
of EU integration and thus the adaptational pressure 
however only slightly differs. In the case of poverty, EU 
competences are weak, and although the EU has 
stronger somewhat competences in the case of educa-
tion, national law remains dominant. Still, we found 
that the governance structures in the field of education 
are characterized by lead-organization governed net-
works, whereas the governance structures in the field 
of poverty are organized by shared participant govern-
ance networks. The answer to this puzzle is found by 
looking at domestic intervening variables which vary 
substantially. The support for EU 2020 among adminis-
trative and political actors, administrative capacity and 
the extent to which the regional level is competent are 
all high in the domain of education, whereas the do-
main of poverty shows lower scores on all these varia-
bles. A first comparative assessment thus suggests that 
strong regional competences coincide with high admin-
istrative capacity. As theorized above, these features 
enhance authoritative actors’ capacity to steer and co-
ordinate other actors resulting in a lead organization 
type of network. The field of education is very out-
spoken in this respect. Hence, domestic intervening 
variables seem to strongly affect the Flemish govern-
ance structures. Furthermore, the strongest support 
for Europe 2020 is also found in the governance struc-
tures with the strongest steering. These findings so far 
are valid for both stages in the fields of education and 
poverty. The lead organization approach in the field of 
education can be attributed to the quasi-exclusive re-
gional competences, the high administrative capacity 
and the strong adherence to the Europe 2020 policies, 
while the shared organization approach coincides with 
regional supplementary powers, low administrative ca-
pacity and weak administrative and political support 
for the Europe 2020 objectives. 
The policy field of energy delivers more puzzling re-
sults. The EU has strong competences is this field, yet 
the governance structures differ in the two policy stag-
es: a weak governance network during the European 
semester and a more mixed governance network dur-
ing the national semester. Given the relatively high ca-
pacity and the status of shared competence, the weak 
governance network during the European stage is ra-
ther surprising. The explanation may be that precisely 
because of the strong EU integration of the policy do-
main of energy, the Europe 2020 targets are rendered 
less salient compared to the high amount of legislative 
proposals. Some respondents pointed out that the en-
ergy policies of Europe 2020 are far less frequently dis-
cussed than legislative proposals, making the presence 
of lead organizations during the European semester 
less necessary. This is different during the download 
stage as both legislation and Europe 2020 policies have 
to be addressed through transposition and reform pro-
grams respectively. From this perspective, the Europe-
an stage of the energy case can be considered as an 
isolated case. Secondly, the governance structure of 
the energy case during the national semester nuances 
our conclusions so far. The mixed network emerges in 
a context of strong support and a high level of EU inte-
gration, which is even stronger than in the education 
cases and which therefore induces a lead organization 
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type of network. However, what makes the energy 
case different from education is the central position of 
VEA and VOKA in the network, VEA’s strong adminis-
trative capacity and the federal competences in energy 
policy. These features seem to decrease the emer-
gence of strong authoritative actors (such as the minis-
terial staff or the competent department) as lead or-
ganizations. Clearly, the capacity and involvement of 
other regional stakeholders join the regional authorita-
tive actors as central players in the network, making 
the governance structure less hierarchical.  
From this we conclude that the type of governance 
structures established to deal with the Europe 2020 
program is determined less by the extent to which a 
policy domain in integrated in the EU or by the degree 
of support among the actors involved, but rather by 
the domestic division of competences and the level of 
administrative capacity of authoritative actors. The 
more competences, the more capacity, the more au-
thoritative executive actors are able to put themselves 
in the center of the network and therefore in charge of 
uploading and downloading Europe 2020 policy. Only 
when other regional stakeholders manage to mobilize 
capacity, the authoritative actors have to share their 
central position, resulting in a more mixed type of 
steering.  
7. Conclusion 
Europe 2020 is the European growth agenda that co-
vers a wide area of policy domains. Yet the impact of 
Europe 2020 plays out differently across policy do-
mains and policy stages. This paper has assessed the 
differentiated Europeanization at the regional level in 
three policy domains: education, energy and poverty. 
Furthermore we have considered two policy stages, 
providing us with six cases situated in the Belgian re-
gion of Flanders. Based on the interactions between 
political, administrative and societal actors, the gov-
ernance structures were mapped and the type and 
strength of their steering assessed. The underlying rel-
evance is that the type of steering affects the effec-
tiveness of the governance structures, whereby the lit-
erature suggests that strongly steered networks 
perform better than weakly steered networks or top-
down controlled structures.  
Our findings indicate variation between policy do-
mains and policy stages. The governance structures in 
the field of education were defined as lead organiza-
tion networks, whereas those in the domain of poverty 
were considered as shared participant networks. In the 
field of energy, variation was even found between poli-
cy stages: the European semester governance structure 
is considered a weak governance network, whereas the 
the national semester network features a more mixed 
network.  
Overall, the extent to which Flanders is competent 
seems to be crucial. Due to extensive regional powers 
lead-organization governed networks are likely to be 
put in place. In order to exercise these powers, a 
strong administrative capacity is needed to steer and 
coordinate the governance structures. EU integration 
may further increase the extent to which Flemish gov-
ernance structures are steered. However, strong EU in-
tegration can also entail a high degree of EU legislation 
which may overshadow Europe 2020 policies, as was 
the case in the upload stage in the energy case. In oth-
er words, competence and capacity matters for the 
way the Europe 2020 policies are governed. Support 
among the actors for Europe 2020, however, was not 
found to affect the strength of steering.  
Clearly, our conclusions are bound to the policy 
domains and the Flemish region examined in this arti-
cle. Future research may broaden the scope to other 
strong legislative regions and other policy domains in 
order to gain a better understanding of the impact of 
Europe 2020 on regional governance structures and of 
the intervening role of domestic variables. Further-
more, increasing the number of cases may open the 
door for more systematic (small N) comparative analy-
sis enhancing the scope of generalization.  
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3. Flemish Agency of Energy (VEA) 
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7. Federation of Belgian Producers of Energy (FEBEG) 
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